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IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS, IMPERFECT LABOR MOBILITY, 
AND MATCHING GRANTS IN A FEDERATION 
WITH DECENTRALIZED LEADERSHIP 
Arthur J. Caplan and Emilson C.D. Silva 
ABSTRACT 
111 
We examine the noncooperative provision of an impure public good by regional 
governments in a federation similar to the European Union, where regional governments are 
Stackelberg leaders and the central government is a Stackelberg follower-a federation with 
decentralized leadership. The center redistributes income and provides budget-balanced 
lump-sum matching grants after it observes the regions' contributions to the impure public good. 
Imperfectly mobile workers react to regional and central governments' policies by establishing 
residence in their most preferred region. Despite the degree of labor mobility, we show that the 
allocation of the impure public good and the interregional income redistribution policy are 
generally efficiently in a federation with decentralized leadership. 
Key words: decentralized leadership; federation; redistribution; labor mobility; matching grants 
IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS, IMPERFECT LABOR MOBILITY, 
AND MATCHING GRANTS IN A FEDERATION 
WITH DECENTRALIZED LEADERSHIP 
I. Introduction 
In what was the first model of a federation with imperfect labor mobility (or regional 
attachment benefits) and spillover-inducing public good provision, Wellisch (1994) shows that at 
least one region under-supplies the pubic good. As Wellisch himself says: "In the case of 
imperfect mobility, regions disagree about their objectives since the migration equilibrium can 
no longer be characterized by equal utilities in each region. At least one (of two) regions cannot 
achieve its desired resource distribution within the federation, and this region has no incentives 
to provide a socially efficient level of public goods generating spillovers. The decentralized Nash 
equilibrium is inefficient." This inefficiency result is important mostly because it has extended to 
the case of imperfect labor mobility Oates' (1972) seminal argument that central government 
intervention can enhance efficiency in the face of spillovers. However, it leaves unanswered the 
questions of which policy instruments and what type of hierarchical structures are capable of 
achieving a socially efficient allocation of public good provision within such a federation. 
Caplan et al. (2000) have provided one possible answer for the case of pure public goods. 
They show that, irrespective of the degree of labor mobility, a federation characterized by 
"decentralized leadership" generally implements efficient public good policies. In this 
framework, decentralized leadership means that the central government makes interregional 
income transfers after it observes the contributions to the pure public good made by the regional 
governments. By pre-committing to their public good contributions in anticipation of the 
center's interregional income policy and subsequent labor mobility, each region therefore has no 
2 
incentive to deviate from the socially efficient allocation in the resulting sub-game perfect 
equilibrium. 1 This result shows that the transfers implemented by the center induce both 
regional governments to face their personalized Lindahl prices, and that the center is therefore 
able to completely nullify the incentives of the regional governments to neglect each other's 
contribution to the pure public good. Left unanswered by Caplan et ai., however, is the question 
of whether or not this type of decentralized leadership is strong enough to implement efficient 
policies for impure public goods. The present paper answers this question in the affirmative, but 
only when the central government is provided with an additional policy instrument - lump-sum 
subsidies in the form of matching grants. 
The previous literature on impure public goods (or what is commonly referred to as 
"impure altruism") provides a precedent for matching-grant subsidies. However, this literature 
has been primarily concerned with the issue of neutrality, not efficiency per se. Thus, the main 
question motivating this vein of research is which set of policies might alter the regions ' (or 
individuals', if we are talking about charitable donations) Nash behavior when it comes to the 
provision of public goods? In the case of pure public good provision, where individuals are 
affected only by the aggregate level of the public good and each individual provides a positive 
level of the public good, Warr (1982) showed that the level of provision is unaffected by a lump-
sum redistribution of income. In other words, the public good is neutral with respect to lump-
sum taxes and transfers that flow from the central government. 2 However, as Warr shows, per-
unit consumption taxes and subsidies on public good contributions will raise the total level of 
provision by affecting the individuals' marginal incentives to donate, and could in fact lead to a 
1 As long as the regional governments each provide positive amounts of the public good. 
2Bergstrom et al. (1986) later showed that this neutrality result does not in general hold when at least one 
individual provides nothing to the public good. 
Pareto optimum if the tax and subsidy rates are set with full information of the necessary 
condition for Pareto optimality, an exceedingly difficult task. 3 
Boadwayet al. (1989), and Andreoni (1989, 1990) have extended the work ofWarr in 
two important respects. Boadway et al. show that Warr's neutrality result is robust to an 
economy with pre-existing tax and subsidy distortions. Further, they find that differential 
per-unit subsidies across agents (rather than Warr's uniform rates) are not only non-neutral, but 
also have the surprising effect of decreasing the welfare of the agent who receives an increased 
subsidy, while increasing the welfare of the agent whose tax is increased.4 Andreoni (1989, 
1990) is the first to analyse the issue of neutrality for the class of impure public goods-goods 
which have both "altruistic" and "egoistic" (or "warm glow") components. He finds that 
neutrality generally does not hold for the case of impure public goods, a result that is consistent 
with findings from the empirical literature on public goods. The reasoning behind this result is 
that the warm glow effect makes private contributions imperfect substitutes for contributions 
from other sources, such as public good provision from other contributors or taxes and subsidies 
from the central government. As Andreoni shows, perfect substitutability is sufficient for 
neutrality. Without perfect substitutability of contributions, "transfers of income to the more 
altruistic from the less altruistic will increase the equilibrium supply of the public good" 
(Andreoni, 1990). These income transfers may take the form of direct or matching grants 
financed by lump-sum taxation; however, matching grants Pareto dominate direct grants. 
3Bernheim (1986) was able to reverse WaIT's non-neutrality result for per-unit taxes and subsidies in a 
sequential equilibrium setting similar to ours. However, in Bernheim's model, the central government provides the 
public good in the fmal stage, after the individuals have made their private-good choices. In our case, the 
individuals (i.e., regions) make their public good choices prior to the central government's choice of taxes and 
subsidies. 
4Boadway et al. (1989) are the fIrst to adopt a federation, rather than a collection of individuals, as their 
framework for analysis in this vein of research. 
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While this more recent literature on impure public goods has clearly identified the 
properties and behavioral assumptions underlying the neutrality hypothesis, it has not adequately 
answered the question of which policy instruments and hierarchical structures are necessary to 
completely reverse the neutrality result. In other words, how do we move beyond Pareto 
dominant outcomes for impure public good provision to the complete set of Pareto efficient 
solutions? 
This paper analyses the class of impure public goods, as modelled by Andreoni (1989, 
1990), within the framework of a federation, as in Boadway et al. (1989). However, the 
federation's hierarchical structure follows that of Caplan et al. (2000). In general, federations are 
complex hierarchical organizations that are typically characterized by the coexistence of 
governments at the central, regional (i.e., state or province) and local levels. In each level of the 
federal hierarchy, a government is usually endowed with a set of policy instruments, which is 
utilized to foster its own objectives. Regional and local governments provide many public 
services and goods. In many instances, however, the economic jurisdiction of a public good 
provided regionally or locally exceeds the political jurisdiction of a regional or local government. 
Impure public goods, such as abatement of a pollutant with both intra- and transboundary 
properties and infrastructure projects, provide good examples of commodities whose economic 
jurisdiction, being the entire federation, encompasses all regional political jurisdictions. Income 
redistribution, another important type of service which is often provided regionally, may also 
generate interregional externalities. 
In the United States, the central government's income-redistribution policy typically 
redistributes income across individuals regardless their regions of residence. In the European 
Union (E.U.), on the other hand, the center redistributes income amongst the national 
governments that constitute the federation. The member nations subsequently redistribute 
income amongst their own residents. Wildasin (1991) shows that "when households are mobile 
among jurisdictions, income redistribution by individual jurisdictions create fiscal externalities" 
(p. 757). Similarly, Epple and Romer (1991) find that local redistribution induces sorting of the 
population, "with the poorest households located in the communities that provide most 
redistribution" (p. 828). 
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We consider three governmental regimes. We first examine a completely decentralized 
regime ala Wellisch (1994), where each region independently controls the level of the transfer 
that it makes to the other region. Next, we examine a regime where the central authority controls 
all policy instruments. This provides a useful benchmark for future comparison. Given our 
assumption about the center's objective function-a weighted sum of the regional governments' 
objective functions-we will be able, in the benchmark situation, to derive the entire set of 
Pareto efficient allocations. The remaining regime, denoted decentralized leadership, is 
characterized by the assumption that the central authority is solely endowed with an instrument 
to make interregional income transfers, and, later, lump-sum matching grants. This will represent 
our characterization of a federal regime in this paper. Both levels of government share 
responsibility over federal policy making, namely, the central government controls the federal 
income- redistribution and subsidy policies and the regional governments, behaving 
noncooperatively, jointly determine the public good policy. 
In this federal regime, the regional authorities are Stackelberg leaders and the central 
authority is a Stackelberg follower. This seems to be a fair representation of the E.U. federation, 
where the governments of the member nations have historically precommitted to their own 
public good policies-the environmental policies of the member nations provide good 
examples-and the central government, through the Maastricht Treaty, has been endowed with 
significant power to redistribute income amongst the member nations after it observes these 
nations' public good policies-i.e., the interregional income transfers implemented with 
resources of the E.D. 's Structural Funds. The allocation of the Structural Funds obeys the 
"additionality" principle, whereby the center's role is restricted to the provision of additional 
resources to help member nations to execute their own policies-such as infrastructure 
development and pollution abatement. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy in the context of a 
completely decentralized federation, where regions playa Nash game and have control over both 
provision of the public good and interregional transfers. Similar to Wellisch (1994) we show 
that while the Nash solution is efficient with respect to population distribution, it is inefficient 
with respect to the allocation of public good provision. As mentioned above, we examine and 
compare two other governmental regimes: a fully centralized (our benchmark allocation) regime 
and a federal regime with decentralized leadership. Section 3 is devoted to the fully centralized, 
Pareto efficient solution. Section 4 considers the decentralized leadership regime where the 
central government retains control over income redistribution policy. In this section we show 
that the center's income redistributive authority is not sufficient to restore the Pareto efficient 
allocation of public good provision across the two regions. Section 5 considers the decentralized 
leadership game where the center retains control over both income redistribution and lump-sum 
matching grants. In this section we show that lump-sum matching grants, financed by budget-
balanced lump-sum taxation, restore the efficient allocation of public good provision that was 
lost in the Nash equilibrium. In each section, labor will be assumed to be imperfectly mobile, a 
characterization of the E. D. 's common labor market. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. The Decentralized Nash Equilibrium 
Imagine a federation with two regions, indexed by j,j = 1,2, two regional governments 
and one central government. There are N individuals in the federation. The population ofregionj 
is denoted nj. Assume that 0 < nj < 1 and N = 4nj = 1, implying that n2 = 1 - nj. The utility of 
the representative resident ofregionj,j = 1,2, is assumed to be 
Vi ={ul(XpqpQ)+a(N -n), 
U
2(X2,q2,Q)+an, 
if the household lives in 1, 
if the household lives in 2. 
(1) 
where ui,j = 1,2, is strictly concave and increasing in all arguments, where Xj is the consumption 
of the private (or numeraire) good, qj denotes the amount of public good provided by regionj 
(i.e., the "egoistic" component of welfare), and Q = 4 qj represents the aggregate amount of the 
public good, or the "altruistic" component of welfare. 5 As in Wellisch (1994), the parameter n 
measures the psychic benefit a household derives from living in region 2 and the parameter (N -
n) the benefit from living in region 1. Thus, households with relatively small n' s are at home in 
region 1, while households with relatively large n's are at home in region 2. The parameter a (a. 
0) expresses the degree of heterogeneity in tastes for a region. The larger is a, the greater the 
intensity of psychic attachment to a respective region. 
Each resident ofregionj is endowed with one unit of labor which is supplied at region}. 
Workers are assumed to be identically productive and are employed in the production of the 
numeraire good. The production possibilities for the numeraire good are represented by a strictly 
concave production function pj (nj; LJJ = jj (nJJ, where Lj denotes the fixed resource endowment 
ofregionj, say land. Since workers are identically productive and are all employed in the 
5The curvature conditions on zI, as well as on! discussed below, ensure concave programming problems 
for each of the cases considered below. Thus, sufficient second-order conditions are satisfied for each of the 
maximization problems considered below. . 
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production of the numeraire good, we assume that each individual's total return from the 
productive activity in region} is jj (n)lnj-
The numeraire good is not only used for consumption, but also as an input in the 
production of the impure public good, at a constant marginal cost of 1. Regional government) 
can therefore produce qj units of the public good at a total cost of qj- Further, we assume that 
relative prices do not change, and that units of all commodities are chosen so that their prices are 
equal to 1.6 Each resident of region},} = 1,2, faces the following budget constraint: 
ql+rl -r2 XI + ---=----=--------=-
nl 
q2+ r 2- r l x2 + -=-=--..:::.-~ 
n2 
if the household lives in 1, 
j=1,2, 
if the household lives in 2. 
(2) 
where for each }, the right-hand side shows the resident's total expenditure and the left-hand side 
gives his total income. The representative resident of region} pays an amount of 1)lnj to region-
}, and receives an amount of 7-jlnj from region-j. 
Households are free to choose where they will reside. Since they differ in their 
attachment to a region, the migration equilibrium is characterized by the marginal household, 
identified by nj, which is indifferent between locating in either region. Substituting (2) into (1), 
and recalling n2 = 1 - nj, the migration equilibrium may therefore be expressed as: 
(3) 
Thus, nj also represents the number of households residing in region 1. 
6 As noted in Boadway et al. (1989), linear production technology assures both constant marginal costs and 
prices. 
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Equation (3) detennines nj as an implicit function of the regional control variables (qj, 1)} 
j=1,2. Thus, total differentiation of(3) enables a full cataloguing of the various migration-
response functions that will prove useful in the remaining analysis of this section: 
1 
Ux 2 1 1 
-+u -u -u 
on n Q q Q 
__ I = ---=-1 ____ _ 
oql D 
2 
2 2 Ux 1 U +u ---u Q q n Q 
2 
D 
j 
(4a) 
(4b) 
(4c) 
(4d) 
h I 2 2 - DOd j _ Ux ( I" j ) 7 . . were uxnl + uxnl - a - < an uxnl - - J n - Xj • The mequahty D < 0 ensures a stable 
nj 
migration equilibrium. It says that starting at the equilibrium, any possible gains in the value of 
net social marginal product that might be realized with an additional individual residing in region 
1 are more than offset by lost attachment benefits. Further, the inequalities in (4a) and (4d) 
demonstrate that the number of residents moving to region 1 is decreasing in the level of that 
region's transfer to region 2, and increasing in the level of region 2's transfer to region 1. In 
addition, migration responses to the levels of qj depend upon the relative strengths of the 
respective egoistic and altruistic components for each respective region. 
7 The subscripts on functions ui and I represent the partial derivatives with respect to the variable indicated. 
Regionj's problem is to choose (qj, 1)} to maximize its welfare (1) subject to (2) and 
response functions (4a)-(4d), taking as given {q-j, 7-j}. The first-order conditions for these 
problems are: 
ou j 
rj ~o and r .--=O 
J or. 
J 
u~ 2 2 2 on1 
--+u +u -u --=0 q Q xnl;::) • 
n2 uq2 
j =1,2, 
As shown in Appendix 1, combining equations (5) yields for the socially efficient 
population distribution: 
_ 2an2 < (1'1 -x )_( 1'2 -x ) < 2an1 
2 - In 1 In 2 - 1 • 
Ux Ux 
To see that (8) implies the efficient population distribution, consider first the perfect 
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(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
mobility case (a = 0). In this case, /,,1 - XI = /,,2 - X 2 ' which is a traditional result indicating that 
net benefits of additional households to regions must be equalized across regions (Wildasin, 
1986). Ifhouseholds are imperfectly mobile (a > 0), then there is a range of efficient allocations 
that vary with respect to the weights of a utilitarian social welfare function, as will be shown in 
Section 3. The population distribution indicated by (8) is a direct result of the equal-utility 
migration equilibrium (3), which induces each region to maximize the common utility level of all 
households in the federation. 
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Equations (6) and (7) yield for the following inefficient allocation of the public goods: 
-j j = 1,2 . (9) 
2 Ux (t,- j ) a- - n -x_j 
n · 
-} 
Equations (9) imply 
(10) 
or that the regions do not provide the public good up to the point where their respective private 
marginal rates of substitution (MRS) are equated. As will be shown in the next section, equal 
private MRS's is a necessary condition for the Pareto efficient provision of the public good. 
Otherwise, a reallocation of the public good could occur which would make both regions better 
off. Thus, the decentralized Nash solution is inefficient. 
3. Pareto Efficiency 
We assume the following objective function for the center:8 
W ( Xl' X2 , ql , q 2 ) = ()u I ( Xl , ql , Q) + (1 - e) u 2 ( X2 , q 2 , Q) (11) 
We further assume that e (0,1). The parameter e corresponds to the weight put on 
region 1 's welfare by the center. We assume that this parameter is determined exogenously by 
egalitarian, institutional or political considerations. For a fixed e, we can obtain an efficient 
allocation by choosing {Xj, qJJj = 1,2 to maximize (11) subject to (3) and the aggregate resource 
constraint for the federation: 
8Even though (11) ignores individual attachment benefits, its maximization subject to (3), which includes 
individual attachment benefits, characterizes a Pareto efficient allocation for a given weight B. Any change in 
location must be accompanied by an increase in either ul or u2; otherwise it would not be made. This 
straightforward revealed preference argument explains why a Pareto efficient allocation must maximize (11) (see, 
e.g., Wellisch(1994, p.171)). 
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(12) 
The set of Pareto efficient allocations, excluding the efficient allocations associated with 
e = 0 and e = 1, can then be derived by straightforward application of the envelope theorem, 
namely, by varying e between 0 and 1 and computing the efficient allocation associated with 
each particular e value. 
As shown in Appendix 2, for a fixed e an efficient allocation is characterized by (3), (8), 
(12) and the following equations, provided the solution is interior: 
j = 1,2 . (13) 
Equations (13) are the familiar Samuelson condition for efficient provision of the pure 
public good. It says that the sum of the MRS's between the public and private goods in 
consumption should equal the marginal rate of transformation between these two goods in 
production. Unlike for the Nash equilibrium, equations (13) imply 
(14) 
or that the regions provide the public good up to the point where their respective private MRS's 
are equated. Thus, equations (8) and (14) are the benchmark conditions for Pareto efficiency. 
4. Decentralized Leadership with Central Control 
of Income Redistribution 
As in Caplan et al. (2000), we initially consider a three-stage game whereby the regional 
governments, acting as Stackelberg leaders, precommit by selecting their contributions to the 
public good prior to the interregional income redistribution policy of the center. The center 
determines its interregional income redistribution policy in the second stage of the game, after 
observing the public good contributions chosen by the regional governments and in anticipation 
13 
of location choices made by residents. Residents make their location choices after they observe 
both contributions to the public good and interregional redistributions of income. 
Formally, the timing for the game is as follows: 9 
Stage 1: Regional government 1 chooses q1 to maximize u 1(Xl, ql, ql + q2) + a(1- nl) subject to 
X1 = Xl(ql, q2) and nl = n21(Xl(ql, q2), X2(ql, q2), ql, q2). Regional government 2 chooses q2 to 
maximize u 2 (X2, q2, q 1 + q2) + anI subject to X2 = X2(q 1, q2) and n1 = n21(Xl(q 1, q2), X2(Q 1, Q2), Q 1, 
Q2). Each regional government takes the other regional government's choice as given. 
Stage 2: The center observes {Ql, Q2} and chooses (XJ1j=I,2 to maximize (10) subject to (11) and 
nl = n21(Xl(Ql, Q2), X2(Ql, Q2), Ql, Q2). 
Stage 3: After observing the choices made in stages 1 and 2, residents select their preferred 
residential locations. 
The migration equilibrium equation (3) enables us to define the implicit function for 
stage three: 10 
(15) 
Assuming an interior solution, we obtain the following first order conditions in the 
center's maximization problem: 11 
(16a) 
(16b) 
where A> 0 is the shadow value of an additional unit of aggregate income for the federation. 
Combining (16a) with (16b) yields the efficient population distribution condition (8). We next 
utilize (12) to define the implicit function: 
9The implicit migration-response function for nj displays a superscript "2" in order to distinguish it from 
the migration-response function utilized in the Nash game of Section 2. 
10The corresponding explicit functions for (15), along with all other derivations for this section are 
included in Appendix 3. 
llWe assume that the local sufficient second order condition is satisfied in the maximization problem of the 
second stage. 
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(17) 
In the first stage of the game, the regional governments choose their contributions to the 
public good taking into account the implicit functions (15) and (17). Assuming that (q) > OJ; = J, 2, 
the first order conditions that characterize the Nash equilibrium in the first stage for regions 1 
and 2, respectively, are as follows: 12 
(18a) 
(18b) 
results in following conditions governing the allocations of the impure public good in regions 1 
and 2, respectively: 
(19a) 
(19b) 
Combining (19a) with (19b) yields (10). The results for the decentralized leadership game with 
central control over income redistribution policy are summarized in Proposition 1: 
Proposition 1: Given our modelling assumptions, the subgame perfect equilibria for the 
decentralized leadership game are inefficient, provided that (q) > OJ; = J, 2 . 
12We assume that the sufficient second-order conditions are satisfied in the maximization problems of the 
first stage. 
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Proposition 1 departs from the result for pure public goods in Caplan et al. (2000), where 
it was found that the central government' s income-redistribution policy under decentralized 
leadership is adequate to ensure the efficient allocation of public good provision across regions. 
Here, the center's income redistribution policy-associated, for example, with the 
implementation of structural and cohesion policies in the European Union-does not obey the 
principle of complete "additionality," whereby the central government offers enough additional 
resources to advance to a social optimum the structural and cohesion policies designed and 
executed by national governments. Proposition 1 says that, when the center's sole policy 
instrument is income redistribution in response to regional policies-such as the structural and 
cohesion policies-imperfect labor mobility and the impureness of the public good, inherent 
characteristics of the E.U. 's economy, are impediments for efficient policy making at the 
regional governmental level. 
Intuitively, Proposition 1 holds because the egoistic components of the impure good are 
not fully internalized in each region prior to location decisions. As we discussed in the 
Introduction, Wellisch (1994) teaches us that household attachment matters for efficiency only if 
location choices are made in the presence of transboundary externalities. In our decentralized 
leadership game, the interregional redistribution policy of the center does not have enough power 
to completely nullify the regional governments' incentives to underprovide the public good. 
Therefore, when it comes time for individuals to decide where they should establish their 
residences, in the third stage of the game, the externalities have not been fully internalized. 
An immediate implication of this intuitive argument is that any subgame perfect equilibrium 
with positive contributions is inefficient regardless the degree of labor mobility: 
Theorem 1: For the decentralized leadership game, any subgame perfect equilibrium with 
positive contributions is inefficient regardless of the level at which residents are attached to 
regIons. 
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Proof: In light of Proposition 1 we need only prove that any subgame perfect equilibrium, with 
positive contributions, for the decentralized leadership game is inefficient when a = 0. If a = 0, 
the first order conditions of the first stage reduce to: 
(20a) 
(20b) 
Equations (20a) and (20b) imply (10) .• 
5. Decentralized Leadership with Central Control of Income Redistribution and Lump 
Sum Matching Grants 
As in Comes and Silva (2000), assume that the central government can now make lump-
sum matching grants to each region, denoted mj, M = 4m) 0, j=i,2. Each region funds the 
matching grants program with budget-balanced lump-sum taxes to the central government, 
denoted 9 = mj, 49 = M. Thus, the aggregate resource constraint may now be rewritten as: 
(21) 
where Pj = qj + mj and P = 4Pj,j=i,2. Similar to the previous game in Section 4, we consider a 
three-stage game whereby the regional governments, acting as Stackelberg leaders, precommit 
by selecting their contributions to the public good prior to the interregional income redistribution 
and matching grant policies of the center. The center determines its policies in the second stage 
of the game, after observing the public good contributions chosen by the regional governments 
and in anticipation of location choices made by residents. Residents make their location choices 
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after they observe contributions to the public good, interregional redistributions of income, and 
matching grants. 
The migration equilibrium condition with matching grants in now expressed as UI(XI, PI, 
P) + a(1 - nI) = U2(X2, P2, P) + anI, which, after substitution of (21) for Xl, may be re-expressed 
as: 
(22) 
Equation (22) defines the implicit migration response functions: 13 
(23) 
In stage two, the central government chooses both x) and m), j= 1,2 to maximize its 
utilitarian social welfare function. Note that when the central government chooses m),j=1,2, 
each region's contribution to the public good is already pre-determined. Since the central 
government takes Q),j=1,2, as given and chooses m),j=1,2, it in fact choosesp),j=1,2. Hence, 
the problem faced by the central government in the second stage of the game is to choose {X2, 
P)1i=I,2 to maximize: 
(24) 
subject to (23). As Appendix 4 shows, this problem yields conditions (8) and (13) directly, 
which implies (14). Since this result holds for any a ~O, it may be re-stated in the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 2: For the decentralized leadership game with lump-sum matching grants, any 
subgame perfect equilibrium with positive contributions is Pareto efficient regardless of the level 
at which residents are attached to regions. 
13The corresponding explicit functions, along with all other derivations for this section, are included in 
Appendix 4. 
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The intuition behind Theorem 2 is as follows. First, the center's choice of Xj ensures the 
efficient population distribution by removing any incentives that residents might have in re-
locating to obtain a higher income level. In other words, because they realize that the center's 
income redistribution policy has endogenized their responses, the residents have no better option 
than to distribute themselves efficiently across the two regions. Second, by choosing its 
matching-grant policy after the regions' choices of public good provision, the center effectively 
controls both the aggregate and regional amounts of the public good that will ultimately be 
produced. Knowing this, the regions' choices in the initial stage are essentially redundant. 
Similar to their choices of how to distribute themselves with respect to population, the regions 
have no better option than to choose the efficient allocation of the public good, even though the 
public good provides 'impure' benefits. Thus, lump-sum matching grants promote the correct 
incentives, and thereby induce the regions to equalize their private MRS's between the numeraire 
and public goodS. 14 
This result is striking for yet another reason. Previous work by Boadway et al. (1989) 
concluded that lump-sum matching grants are neutral, in that they leave unchanged the level of 
the public good in the new Nash equilibrium. Andreoni (1990) also found that lump-sum grants, 
funded by lump-sum taxation, are neutral for impure public goods. Only with per-unit subsidies 
was he able to find non-neutrality. These results are therefore in direct contrast to our's. Not 
only are lump-sum grants non-neutral, but they are capable of restoring Pareto efficiency in a 
federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility. Thus, we have also found 
14The comparative static solutions behind Theorem 2 also yield additional insight into this general result. 
For the case ofM ;4), aMiaQ = -1 , ac/a~ = -1, ac/aq_j = O,j=1,2. Thus, the central government's optimal matching 
grants policy reduces each region's lump-sum tax one-for-one for each additional unit of public good provision by 
the regions. 
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a corrective policy for the type of inefficiency first encountered by Wellisch (1994) in his model 
of a federation. 
6. Conclusions 
We have shown that in a federation such as the European Union, characterized by 
decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility, regional provision of impure public goods 
may be Pareto efficient. Theorem 2, indeed, tells us that a decentralized leadership game, 
whereby regional governments precommit to contributions to an impure public good in 
anticipation of the center's interregional income and matching grant policies and subsequent 
labor mobility, has efficient subgame perfect equilibria as long as the regional governments 
provide positive amounts of the public good. This important result does not depend on the 
regional attachment benefits derived by the residents of the federation. 
This result extends several branches of the public goods literature. For instance, it 
extends the Comes and Silva (2000) result for matching grants to the case of imperfect labor 
mobility. It extends the Wellisch (1994) and Caplan et al. (2000) results to the case of impure 
public goods. It also extends the work on neutrality by Boadway et al. (1989) and Andreoni 
(1989, 1990) by qualifying the role that a federation's structural hierarchy can play in 
'neutralizing the effects of neutrality' by inducing an efficient provision of public goods in a 
decentralized leadership setting. 
The standard assumption that all income generated within a region accrues only to 
residents of that region, on an equal per-capita basis, is employed here to derive all results. An 
interesting avenue for future work would be to consider situations whereby migrants retain 
possession of their non-human wealth when they move from one place to another, since this 
appears to be ubiquitous. In such an extension, migrants and non-migrants would typically be 
20 
heterogeneous, a factor that may generate pecuniary externalities and diversity of incentives 
within regions. Our intuition, however, tells us that our main result-Theorem 2-would remain 
valid in this more complex setting, since the interregional policies of the center would induce the 
regional governments to adopt policies that maximize the federation's total income. Therefore, 
all externalities would be completely internalized and individual wealth levels would not be 
sensitive to migration decisions. 
21 
Appendix 1 
To derive (8), begin with (5) for region 1. Substitute (4a) into (5) and rearrange to get: 
2an2 (1 ) (2 ) 
---< I' -x - I' -x 2 - In 1 In 2· 
Ux 
(AI) 
Similarly for region 2, substitute (4b) into (5) and rearrange to get: 
(A2) 
Bring (AI) and (A2) together to get (8). Substituting (4c) into (6) and rearranging yields (9) for 
region 1, and substituting (4d) into (7) and rearranging likewise yields (9) for region 2 .• 
Appendix 2 
The center chooses {Xl, X2, q], Q2, nd to maximize the Lagrangian: 
The first-order conditions for this problem are: 
(BI) 
(B2) 
eu~ + eU~ + (1- e)U~ - A + tp ( U~ + U~ - U~ ) = 0, (B3) 
eu~ + (1- e)U: + (1- e)U~ - A + tp ( U~ - U: - U~ ) = 0 , (B4) 
(B5) 
Equations (B 1) and (B2) imply 
1 2 
Ux (e+ tp) =~(l-e - tp). 
n1 n2 
(B6) 
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Successive substitution of (B1) into (B3) and then (B6) results in (13) for region 1. Similar 
manipulations of (B2), (B4), and (B6) results in (13) for region 2. Solving (B1) and (B2) for A 
and 'IF yields, respectively, 
(B7) 
(B8) 
Substituting (B7) and (B8) into (B5) yields (8) .• 
Appendix 3 
A straightforward exercise in comparative statics yields the following migration response 
functions from (3): 
(C1) 
(C2) 
(C3) 
(C4) 
Similarly, total differentiation of (12), accounting for (15), yields the following income-
redistribution response functions: 
(C5) 
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(C6) 
( u~ - ~~ - u~ J ( Xl - X 2 + In2 - 1,,1 ) + 1 IJx2 = _--0...-___ -----'-_______ _ 
8 q, _ ~~ ( x, - x, + I.' - I.' ) + n, (C7) 
2 -~(x -X + /,2 - /'l)+n 2a 1 2 J n J n 2 
(C8) 
( 
U~ - U~ J ( 2 I ) 
8 x, = _ 2a Xi - x, + I. - I. + 1 
IJQ 
(C9) 
( u~ - u~ J ( 2 1 ) 2a Xl - X 2 + In - I" + 1 IJx2 = 
IJQ 
(CI0) 
Substituting (C5)-(CI0) into the expressions for 4,j=1,2 proves that (19a) and (19b) yield (10) . 
• 
Appendix 4 
A straightforward exercise in comparative statics yields the following migration response 
functions from (22): 
(Dl) 
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] 2 (] ] ) 
on] = Ux +n]up -n] Up +up 
op] D (D2) 
1 ] (2 2) on1 = Ux -n1up + n] Up +Up 
OP2 D 
(D3) 
where D = u! (In1 - In2 + x2 - x]) - 2an1 < 0 for a stable migration equilibrium. In the second 
stage, maximization of (24) with respect to {X2, PJh=J,2 and subject to (22) and (D1) - (D3) yields 
(13) and thus (14) .• 
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